F rom East Germany to the Philippines, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Armenia, Algeria and Sudan, people power movements often topple entrenched regimes with surprisingly peaceful efficacy-even when relatively small numbers of people participate. This raises the question of how movements succeed despite mobilizing modest proportions of popular participation. Although a recent experimental study has identified a 25% tipping point in the ability of coordinated groups to revise or overthrow existing systems 1 , free-riding behaviour often prevents movements from mobilizing more than 5% of the population of a country 2 . However, most mass uprisings that have mobilized 3.5% of the population against dictatorships have nevertheless succeeded in overthrowing them 3far less than the critical mass thresholds of 10-25% tipping points that have been identified in previous studies 1, 4, 5, 6 . We propose that the momentum of dissent is a product of participation (mass) and the number of protest events in a week (velocity) (that is, p = mv). We test the correlation between movement momentum and irregular leader exit in African countries between 1990 and 2014. Our findings show that movement momentum is significantly correlated with irregular leader departure. Notably, these findings may provide a straightforward way for dissidents around the world to quantify their potential by assessing their participation rates and the concentration of their activities over time.
F rom East Germany to the Philippines, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Armenia, Algeria and Sudan, people power movements often topple entrenched regimes with surprisingly peaceful efficacy-even when relatively small numbers of people participate. This raises the question of how movements succeed despite mobilizing modest proportions of popular participation. Although a recent experimental study has identified a 25% tipping point in the ability of coordinated groups to revise or overthrow existing systems 1 , free-riding behaviour often prevents movements from mobilizing more than 5% of the population of a country 2 . However, most mass uprisings that have mobilized 3.5% of the population against dictatorships have nevertheless succeeded in overthrowing them 3far less than the critical mass thresholds of 10-25% tipping points that have been identified in previous studies 1, 4, 5, 6 . We propose that the momentum of dissent is a product of participation (mass) and the number of protest events in a week (velocity) (that is, p = mv). We test the correlation between movement momentum and irregular leader exit in African countries between 1990 and 2014. Our findings show that movement momentum is significantly correlated with irregular leader departure. Notably, these findings may provide a straightforward way for dissidents around the world to quantify their potential by assessing their participation rates and the concentration of their activities over time.
Although studies have shown that large numbers of participants increase the chances of movement success 7 , the impact of participation on the effectiveness of civil resistance movements is often based on reported peak participation, rather than dynamic ebbs and flows of participation. For instance, a previous study 7 reported a million participants in the people power movement in the Philippines, rather than capturing the number of reported participants in each of the hundreds of protest events linked to that movement from 1983 to 1986. Accounting for only peak participation rates neglects the effect of dynamic participation on the success of civil resistance campaigns over time. In other words, there is no ability to understand how changing levels of participation may have contributed to Ferdinand Marcos' departure as president of the Philippines. Additionally, existing research is generally poor at identifying the timing of success for social movements. Most existing studies, in fact, use yearly data on different features of movements and their opponents 7 . As such, researchers have not yet understood how movements effectively build initiative in ways that tip them over into success-particularly in the face of repression. The characteristics of successful social movements are better understood than their dynamics.
In this Article, we advance two core propositions. First, we argue that, although the size of participation is indeed a crucial determinant of the success of mass uprisings, it is an incomplete indicator of movement potential. Instead, we argue that movement momentum may be essential to understanding the strength of mass mobilization. We argue that momentum is determined by both the number of participants and the concentration of dissident activities in time: the interaction between movement size and velocity. Second, we propose that the momentum that movements deploy on a daily basis is strongly correlated with major political changes. We find support for these propositions by testing them on irregular leader exits in African countries between 1990 and 2014. We focus our study on this region because of the availability of a unique dataset on protest and state response; however, there is a rich literature on protest and power in Africa emerging from scholars with knowledge and expertise on the continent, and ours should be situated alongside such esssential work 8, 9 . Although the research design does not allow us to make causal claims, our findings suggest that nonviolent dissidents may be able to use insights from physics to leverage publicly accessible indicators to estimate the momentum that they can bring to bear against their adversaries on any given day.
We turn to a simple analogy from physics-that momentum equals mass times velocity-to show how activists can estimate their momentum using publicly available indicators. In social movements, one proxy for mass is the number of observed participants in nonviolent events (including protests, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, marches and other nonviolent methods 7,10 . We introduce a proxy for velocity, which we operationalize as the number of protests that are observed in a given week. We estimate momentum by multiplying the number of observed participants The physics of dissent and the effects of movement momentum Erica Chenoweth 1 * and Margherita Belgioioso 2 * How do 'people power' movements succeed when modest proportions of the population participate? Here we propose that the effects of social movements increase as they gain momentum. We approximate a simple law drawn from physics: momentum equals mass times velocity (p = mv). We propose that the momentum of dissent is a product of participation (mass) and the number of protest events in a week (velocity). We test this simple physical proposition against panel data on the potential effects of movement momentum on irregular leader exit in African countries between 1990 and 2014, using a variety of estimation techniques. Our findings show that social movements potentially compensate for relatively modest popular support by concentrating their activities in time, thus increasing their disruptive capacity. Notably, these findings also provide a straightforward way for dissidents to easily quantify their coercive potential by assessing their participation rates and increased concentration of their activities over time.
per thousand individuals in the national population by the number of protest events in the week preceding the current day. We operationalize mass, velocity and momentum using various alternative measures, including a logarithmic transformation of the mass indicator (see Methods).
There are many reasons to assume that the momentum of mobilization-rather than just mass participation-is an important driver of major political and social changes. We expect that momentum creates repeated and visibly unrelenting interactions between dissidents and state elites, which may elicit key defections among ruling elites. Often, economic elites, state media authorities, cultural authorities or civilian bureaucrats refuse to continue cooperating with the leaders of the regime during periods of mass discontent. These loyalty shifts among key elites-typically sparked by mass mobilization-are often the lynchpin in securing the victory of month-or year-long mass movements. Such mechanisms have proved critical to successful mass movements around the world. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s in South Africa, mass protests, consumer boycotts and international sanctions and divestments from abroad were ultimately so economically and politically disruptive that white business elites demanded that the Apartheid regime negotiate with the African National Congress.
Movement momentum-where large numbers of dissidents amass over a sustained period, rather than just in a one-off eventmay be particularly influential in convincing security forces to end their cooperation with the incumbent regime. As large numbers of dissidents persist in concentrated mass mobilizations, momentum may make repression more politically costly, leading security forces to rethink their loyalties. The fact that the behaviour of the security forces is often important in determining the outcomes of mass movements is well-established in the literature on social movement success 7,10,11 . For example, in October 2000, protestors in Serbia mobilized against Slobodan Milošević after fraudulent elections. Police officers ultimately refused to obey orders to fire on demonstrators or abandoned their posts, recognizing members of their own communities or families in the crowd. Protestors then stormed Parliament, and Milošević fled the country and conceded the election to the opposition leader. We observed similar dynamics in countries as diverse as the Philippines (1986), Tunisia (2010) and Iran (1979) .
What is less well understood is how movements have built the strength to activate such behaviour. We suggest that as the momentum of mobilization increases-as a function of the mass of participants and velocity of nonviolent dissent-pressure may increase among the population and among elites to demand or orchestrate a change in national leadership.
We articulate the following hypothesis: movement momentum is positively correlated with the likelihood of movement success.
results
Study design and data. We test this proposition by estimating the potential effect of the momentum of nonviolent dissent on the relative risk of the irregular exit of leadership through a compiled dataset of country-day observations in Africa from 1990 to 2014. Ideally, such data would have been available worldwide, but at the time of analysis only one dataset existed that carried this level of event detail cross-nationally and over time. Researchers associated with the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) 12 had carefully unearthed detailed event-level data from news reports, resulting in the only available peer-reviewed protest database with such broad regional and temporal coverage. Our unit of analysis is the country-day, reflecting our focus on temporally granulated contentious dynamics, rather than structural or time-invariant characteristics of states and of non-state actors. Our dataset therefore builds on the SCAD 12 , which includes information on participation and occurrence of protests, riots, strikes, intercommunal conflict, government violence against civilians and other forms of social conflict that are not systematically tracked in other conflict datasets, as well as the ARCHIGOS dataset 13 , which identifies the manner by which rulers leave political power. To obtain the dependent variable, we looked for instances in which the leader lost power through irregular means, defined as leader removal 'in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions' 13 . This form of exit is exceedingly rare, occurring only 45 times out of over 295,000 observations in Africa between 1 January 1990 and 1 January 2014. We then conducted additional research on each instance to produce a strict measure that excludes cases of irregular leader exit due to assassinations or coups that appeared to be part of internal political manoeuvers or personal vendettas outside of the underlying context of popular revolts. Our strict measure of irregular leader exit therefore includes only the 24 cases of irregular leader exits that occurred in otherwise peaceful contexts but for which dissidents had called for the incumbent national leader to step down at some point in the preceding three months. This measure serves as a tough test of movement effectiveness by providing a clear and discrete indicator that the movement has produced a significant political transformation. Future research could attempt to identify other discrete outcomes of interest to various movements-such as the adoption or rejection of specific policy changes or reforms-that might allow assessment of movement impacts more broadly.
The resulting dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when a leader loses power through irregular means and 0 otherwise. Table 1 reports the cases and the primary mechanism of departure. As can be seen from the data, in almost all cases, a shift in the loyalties of security forces or civilian elites led to the leader's departure, further supporting our assumptions. Of course, such loyalty shifts may have occurred in some cases without resulting in irregular leader departure; however, Table 1 illustrates the mechanism at work in previous studies of mass movement outcomes.
To construct a dynamic variable for movement mass, we first generated a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when a nonviolent event occurs and 0 otherwise. We obtained this indicator by extracting information from the variable 'etype' in SCAD 12, 14 . We coded organized demonstrations, spontaneous demonstrations, general strikes and limited strikes, and riots as nonviolent events, because the common denominator of each of these event types is the intended use of peaceful means to obtain a political goal. We excluded events in which an identifiable armed group engages in acts of violence, such as hit-and-run attacks, shootings or bombings.
We then created a variable that measures the average number of participants in each event by extracting information from the 'Npart' variable in SCAD, which is based on a seven-point scale that ranges from very low participation (less than ten people) to very high participation (more than a million). We generated the variable mass to approximate the number of observed participants in nonviolent events per thousand individuals of the national population of a country. Our indicator of mass ranges from 0 to 132.634 participants per thousand (mean = 0.165, s.d. = 2.094). Because of the nonnormal distribution of this variable, we also created an alternate log-transformed version of this variable, which we then standardized (by adding 10 to each value) to yield only positive values. This indicator ranges from 0.508 to 14.888 (mean = 8.238, s.d. = 3.022). We note that the indicator removes all instances in which no participants were observed in the current observation, yielding a much smaller sample conditional on the occurrence of an event and a number of observed participants that is greater than zero.
We next derived a variable for the velocity of events. To obtain this, we counted the total number of events of nonviolent dissent in the seven days preceding the current country-day. This indicator ranges from 0 to 189 (mean = 48.405, s.d. = 46.329).
Because p = mv, we then created the interaction term momentum, which multiplies the mass and velocity of dissent for the current day.
It ranges in value from 0 to 5,649 (mean = 6.463, s.d. = 70.05). We also created an alternate measure of momentum that multiples the log-transformed values of mass and velocity of dissent. This indicator ranges from 2.667 to 2,195.354 (mean = 469.367, s.d. = 380.009).
Because some scholars consider riots a form of violent dissent 10 , we created strict measures of mass, velocity and momentum, which exclude riots and include only nonviolent methods of dissent, such as protests and strikes.
We implement a series of control variables that capture other factors that might affect the likelihood of irregular leader exit. First, we control for the absolute change in the number of locations where nonviolent events took place by extracting information from the variable 'sublocal' in SCAD 14 , which provides a numerical count of the individual localities where nonviolent dissent took place. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the likelihood of irregular leader change as incidences of resistance become more widespread throughout the country.
Second, we expect that repression discourages dissent, therefore making events rarer over time 15 . However, higher levels of repression of nonviolent dissent might also be more likely to backfire, increase participation in the future and elicit defections by security forces, thus increasing the likelihood of political change 11, 16, 17 . We extract an indicator of repression from SCAD 14 , coded as 1 if security forces use nonlethal coercion against dissidents, 2 if security forces used lethal repression against dissidents and 0 otherwise.
Third, because civil wars are relatively more rare in our sample than low-intensity violence, we also construct a variable that measures the number of violent events in the preceding week based on event type 8 from the SCAD database, which we expect to be associated with a decreased likelihood of irregular leader change 7, 18, 19 .
Furthermore, widespread poverty may create economic grievances that undermine the capacity of the state to mount an effective response and generate or reinforce elite-level conflict with the government [20] [21] [22] . We therefore include a measure of log-transformed gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 23 , which we expect to have a positive association with the likelihood of irregular leader exit. Finally, we include a measure of log-transformed total state population 23 to account for the fact that states with larger populations tend to have higher likelihoods of political instability [24] [25] [26] [27] .
Results. We estimate rare-event logistic regression models on irregular leader exit, because such outcomes occur in only 0.0001% of the observations in the study. Table 2 presents eight model specifications. The models generally support our hypothesis, showing that the potential effect of momentum is generally positive and significant regardless of whether we use the general measure (models 1, 3 and 4), rare-event logit models on the full sample (models 1 and 3) or restricting the pool of observations in which an event occurred (models 4, 5 and 6), and both the normal measure of mass (models 1, 3, and 4) and the log-transformed measure of The substantive correlation between momentum and the predicted probability of irregular leader exit is considerable-the probability more than triples from the minimum to the maximum values-although as a rare event, the absolute values of the predicted probabilities are fairly modest. To illustrate the association between momentum and irregular leader exit, we plot the predicted probabilities of such exits only on days in which a protest takes place based on the rare-event conditional logistic regression performed in model 4. Figure 1 shows the predicted probability of irregular leader exit at different values of velocity, when mass mobilization equals 1.5%, 3.5% or 5% of the national population size.
We note that most of the statistically significant observations come at upper ranges of the interaction term (for example, when velocity is greater than 160 and mass mobilization is greater than 3.5% of the population), suggesting that the relationship between momentum and irregular leader exit is most relevant at the upper bounds of mass and velocity. Because mass mobilization rarely occurs at such significant levels, we draw on model 6, in which mass is log transformed, to plot the marginal effects of velocity on irregular leader exit given quantile values of log-transformed mass (Fig. 2) , correcting for the non-normality of the mass indicator. Figure 2 further supports the finding that when mass is at its highest value-constituting about 132 people per thousand individuals, or 13.263% of the national population-the probability of irregular leader exit surpasses 60% at the highest levels of velocity. Moreover, at the highest participation rates, the probability of irregular leader exit increases at a velocity of 40 events per week (observations that exceed this value represent the 58th percentile of cases in our sample).
However, it is important to note that below the 75th percentile of mass (0.138% of the national population size) and the median value of velocity 28 , the probability of irregular leader exit on any given day remains low. When velocity is set at or below the median value of 28 events per week, no levels of mass increased the probability of success for nonviolent movements. This is consistent with the fact that both large-scale mass mobilization and irregular leader exit are rare events, as well as the fact that these figures are based on the conservative assumption that a protest occurs on the same day as the leader departs.
Notably, in none of the observations did participation exceed 13.3% of the national population, thus making the 25% threshold of participation identified in previous studies 1 moot in this regional sample. However, the findings also demonstrate that in the rare cases in which more than 3.5% of the national population does mobilize at a high velocity, the predicted probability of irregular leader exit increases substantially. Taken together, these statistical and substantive results provide an important corrective to existing studies that suggest that peak participation rates alone are sufficient to tip the balance to success 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 . With regard to the other covariates, the diffusion of nonviolent dissent has a positive association across four of the seven models, providing support for our assumption that more-widespread diffusion of events is associated with greater disruptive potential 29 . Second, in models 3 and 8, we find no credible evidence that violent events have a systematic correlation with leadership departure, consistent with previous studies 7, 10, 19 . Population size is negatively and significantly associated across all models, showing that larger countries experience fewer irregular leader exits. Moreover, GDP per capita has no association, suggesting that the potential effects of momentum are robust across countries with varying levels of economic development. Finally, the coefficient for repression is consistently positive and statistically significant: a greater number of repressive incidents correlates with a higher risk of irregular leader exit. This finding might provide evidence in support of a backfire process that leads to the defection of security forces 7, 10, 11, 16 or represent an endogenous process, in which the most threatening mass mobilizations are those that both respond to and elicit higher rates of repression 18 . Experimental studies or those that can account for endogenous processes could further assess these possibilities. However, higher instances of repression by state forces do not appear to undermine the strong positive correlation between movement momentum and leadership change. In summary, we find robust evidence that momentum has a notable association with the likelihood of irregular leader exit. The potential effect of momentum does not change depending on control variables or a vast series of model specifications.
Discussion
There are several important limitations to the present study. First, the findings address correlation and not causation, by the nature of the data and the design; additional research could address causal processes more directly. Second, we test our propositions on data from one region because of data availability on our core variables of interest; however, we believe that the insights derived from the African context can apply more generally and recommend further research to investigate their generalizability around the world when reliable global data become available. Third, we note here that irregular leader exit does not necessarily result in equitable, peaceful or stable outcomes, nor does it guarantee that movement success is obtained in the long term. Further research could assess the degree to which irregular leader exits that are induced by mass resistance yield such outcomes, although some existing studies have suggested that when mass resistance is primarily nonviolent, transitions to democracy are more common than when resistance is violent 7, 28, 30, 31 . Fourth, we were not able to assess whether transnational actors-such as foreign governments, international organizations, international media, transnational solidarity networks or the private sector-influence either the capacity of dissidents to organize consistently or the decision calculus of the leaders and their pillars of support. The collection of such data could further research in this area as well, although we caution that existing studies have found little support for the notion that powerful foreign states can effectively back nonviolent resistance movements without undermining their vital, local bases of support 7 . Finally, our research design limits us to understanding the correlation between momentum and irregular leader exit on any given day; it does not assess the cumulative impacts of mobilization over a longer term, nor does it evaluate threshold effects specifically. Future work could attempt to study these relationships more dynamically.
Despite these limitations, our study points to three important insights. First, movements that mobilize a relatively modest Momentum is significantly correlated with the probability of irregular leader exit (coefficient = 0.004; P = 0.003; n = 16,420). We used the conditional logit model, because it produces more conservative statistical estimates. However, we used conditional logit (rather than rare-event conditional logit) regression, because rare-event logistic regression models preclude the visualization of two-variable marginal effects. We generated this figure using the marginsplots function in STATA, based on model 4. Confidence intervals are not presented, because STATA uses the delta method to calculate confidence intervals, which renders them numerically not meaningful. The Supplementary Information, however, includes the commands and output of our statistical models (including delta standard errors and confidence intervals), so that readers can evaluate the model and results. = 13,969) . For ease of interpretation, we report the raw values of mass as a percentage of the total national population rather than the log-transformed mass indicator. We use the conditional logit model, because it produces more conservative statistical estimates. However, we use conditional logit (rather than rare-event conditional logit) regression because rareevent logistic regression models preclude the visualization of two-variable marginal effects. We generated this figure using the marginsplots function in STATA, based on model 6. Confidence intervals are not presented because STATA uses the delta method to calculate confidence intervals, which renders them numerically not meaningful. The replication file (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JYM19E) includes the commands and output of our statistical models (including delta standard errors and confidence intervals), so that readers can evaluate the model and results.
proportion of the population increase their disruptive potential when they concentrate high-participation nonviolent activities in time. Such nonviolent events are not limited to protests: many involve a diverse array on nonviolent techniques, such as strikes, boycotts and other forms of mass non-cooperation. Indeed, organizers and activists sometimes refer to the need to prepare for and harness momentum as way to build their movements' capacity for change 32 . For movements and activists who are attempting to assess their potential for political change, momentum equals mass times velocity. Second, the momentum of the movements described in this study was more dependent on their own resources, organization and stamina than on the response of the opponent. In this regard, our findings suggest that movements can in fact increase their momentum by planning numerous nonviolent mass mobilizations in concentrated intervals in sequence. And the momentum of the movement in such instances is not likely to be diminished by the way the state responds. Finally, these findings also shed light on a simple yet far-reaching fact regarding social movement mobilization: activists may be able to estimate their absolute levels of momentum by taking into account the number of participants in current events as well as how many events that have occurred in relatively short periods of time. The more people who are involved, and the more concentrated nonviolent events become in time, the more momentum the movements have. And, although we cannot specify a causal relationship, our results show that high levels of momentum significantly correlate with a high likelihood that the leader exits through irregular means across a large number of robustness checks. Our study does not yet allow us to speculate whether these findings apply to movements with more limited or policy-related goals, nor does it allow us to generalize to other regions. Yet, if the findings are replicated in other regions and in other movement contexts, this intuitive metric may be accessible to many people who are engaged in activism on the ground and who seek a better sense of how strong their movements are becoming day to day.
Methods
We rely on panel data to study the correlation between movement momentum and irregular leader exit in African countries between 1990 and 2014. We use a variety of estimation techniques. No statistical methods were used to predetermine sample sizes, but our sample sizes are considerably larger than those reported in previous publications 2, 7, 11 .
Measurements. We describe the construction of our variables in the main text; however, we offer some additional details on several measures here. To develop the dependent indicator for irregular leader exit, we extract the variable 'EXIT' from ARCHIGOS and retain only the instances of leaders who lost power through irregular means, defined as leader removal 'in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions' 13 and that are typically owing to conflicts between domestic forces that involve the threat or use of contentious political activities, popular revolts, coups and assassinations, as well as cases in which external interventions or warfare resulted in the removal of the leader. In the text, we report findings based on the strict measure of only 24 irregular leader exits. In the Supplementary Information, we report findings based on the measure of all 45 irregular leader exits, for which the findings are consistent with our overall analysis.
To construct our variable for mass, we rely on the Npart variable from SCAD 14 as well as an indicator of annual national population size from the World Bank 23 . Npart measures the total number of participants in each event as follows 14 :
(1) less than 10; (2) 10-100; (3) 101-1,000; (4) 1,001-10,000; (5) 10,001-100,000; (6) 100,001-1,000,000; (7) over 1,000,000. We set the number of participants to 9 for category (1) and to 1,000,001 for category (7) and take the average number of participants for all of the remaining intervals in the scale. We then divided the total number of daily participants in protest by the national population size and normalized the variable to reflect the number of participants per thousand individuals for ease of interpretation.
Statistical analyses.
We estimate rare-event logistic regression models on irregular leader exit because such outcomes occur in only 0.0001% of the observations in the study. In several models, we estimate conditional logistic regression on irregular leader exit, which estimates the models only in cases in which dissidents are observed protesting in the current observation. For all models, we include a cubic polynomial approximation using a variable on the years since the last irregular exit of a leader to correct for time dependence, as irregular exits of leaders are more likely to recur when there is a recent history of an irregular exit of the leader 14, 24 . Two-tailed tests are applied. We cluster standard errors by country as the variance may differ systematically across states. Likelihood ratio tests are performed on logistic regressions of the model, and Wald tests are performed on rare-event logistic regressions of the model. Finally, we estimate the variance inflation factor and find no evidence of multicollinearity among our covariates; the correlation coefficients across all variables similarly show low correlations across all covariates. The results are consistent across various additional robustness checks and alternative specifications, which are included in the Supplementary Information. Last updated by author(s): Jun 17, 2019 Reporting Summary Nature Research wishes to improve the reproducibility of the work that we publish. This form provides structure for consistency and transparency in reporting. For further information on Nature Research policies, see Authors & Referees and the Editorial Policy Checklist.
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